US and Allies Sign AI Supply Chain Accord Aimed at China: What It Covers
Key Takeaways
- The United States and eight partner countries signed the San Francisco Declaration on 15 November, committing to protect AI technologies and supply chains from China.
- The nine signatories are the US, Japan, Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom, South Korea, India, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
- Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission are expected to sign next week.
- The accord covers semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and industrial capacity, and centres on a joint list of technologies to protect.
- It is part of Pax Silica, the US-led initiative launched in December 2025 to build AI supply chains that do not depend on China.
- The declaration's text has not yet been published, so the details rest on the Financial Times' reporting of a briefing by the US official who negotiated it.
- The signing comes days before President Trump is due to meet President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC forum in Shenzhen.
What Was Signed
On Sunday 15 November, the United States and eight partner countries signed a declaration aimed at securing the technologies, materials, and infrastructure needed to develop artificial intelligence. The agreement is called the San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity, and it was signed in San Francisco, according to the Financial Times, which first reported the deal.
The Financial Times' report was the original account of the signing, and every other outlet covering the story so far is drawing on it. That matters, because the declaration's text has not been published by the US State Department. As of Sunday evening, the State Department's Pax Silica pages had not published the new declaration, and the most recent entry was still Paraguay's accession on 23 October. For now, then, what is publicly known about the accord comes from the Financial Times' reporting of a briefing by Jacob Helberg, the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who negotiated the pact.
The nine countries that signed are the United States, Japan, Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom, South Korea, India, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Four more are expected to join next week: Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission. Helberg told the Financial Times that those four are expected to sign in the week after 15 November.
The timing is deliberate. The signing comes just days before President Donald Trump is scheduled to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Shenzhen. The meeting is expected on Thursday 19 November, according to reporting on the summit. Signing a pact aimed squarely at reducing dependence on China, days before sitting down with China's leader, is a negotiating signal as much as a policy step.
The Joint List: The Heart of the Accord
The core of the agreement is a shared list. The signatories have pledged to jointly identify the sensitive AI technologies and critical supply chains that need protection from theft or unauthorised transfer, and to coordinate measures to keep them secure. That list does not yet exist in published form. The declaration commits the partners to produce it, and to treat the security of those technologies and the infrastructure behind them as a shared responsibility.
Helberg's framing, as reported by the Financial Times and carried by Newsmax, is that the technologies and infrastructure supporting AI development often span multiple countries, which makes supply chain security a shared responsibility. The declaration states that economic security is fundamental to national security, and calls for stronger protections against the theft or unauthorised transfer of technologies that could provide military or intelligence advantages to hostile actors.
The scope of what the list will cover is broad. According to the reporting, the declaration covers semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and industrial capacity. That is, in effect, the full stack a nation needs to build advanced AI: the minerals dug out of the ground, the energy to power the data centres, the chips that do the computing, and the factories that make them. The signatories also intend to share information about areas where supply chains should be diversified, and to set up working groups to address vulnerabilities in AI supply chains and develop economic hubs to attract investment in related industries.
What the declaration does not appear to do, at least on the reporting available so far, is impose specific export controls, tariffs, or investment restrictions. It is a commitment to identify what needs protecting and to coordinate on how to protect it, not a set of rules in itself. Whether the joint list, once produced, leads to concrete measures such as export controls, investment screening, or enforcement action is the question that will determine whether the accord has teeth. For now, that question is unanswered, and the honest answer is that nobody outside the negotiating room knows.
Who Signed, and Who Is Still to Come
The nine signatories are a deliberate mix. Japan and South Korea are central to the semiconductor supply chain: Japan supplies materials and equipment, South Korea makes memory chips. Australia is a major supplier of critical minerals. The United Kingdom and Israel bring research, chip design, and cybersecurity. India offers manufacturing scale and a large engineering workforce. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates bring energy and capital, and both have been investing heavily in AI infrastructure.
The four expected to join next week, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission, would add considerable weight. Germany is Europe's largest economy and a major industrial power. The Netherlands is home to ASML, the company that makes the lithography machines without which advanced chips cannot be produced at all. Sweden brings telecoms and industrial technology. The European Commission's signature would signal that the European Union as a bloc is aligning with the effort, even though the EU's own member states have often been cautious about measures framed as targeting China.
It is worth keeping the numbers straight, because the membership picture is easy to confuse. The nine countries that signed the San Francisco Declaration are a smaller group than the wider Pax Silica coalition, which has around 25 signatories to its original declaration, with Taiwan participating without signing. Paraguay became the 26th signatory of the original Pax Silica declaration on 23 October 2026. The San Francisco Declaration is a new, narrower agreement within that broader framework, signed by a subset of the coalition.
What Pax Silica Is
To understand the accord, it helps to understand the initiative it belongs to. Pax Silica is the US-led initiative on AI and supply chain security, launched by the State Department in December 2025 and headed by Under Secretary Jacob Helberg. The name combines the Latin word for peace with silica, the compound refined into silicon, the foundational element of computer chips.
The initiative is focused on the tangible physical stack of the AI economy: critical minerals, energy inputs, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, AI infrastructure, and logistics. It is not about AI frontier models such as ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, or Anthropic's Claude. It is about the physical things those models depend on, and about making sure that the supply of those things does not depend on a country the United States considers a strategic rival.
Pax Silica is not a trade agreement. It is a non-binding political and economic security coalition, a statement of principles with no concrete commitments in its original declaration. That description comes from analysts who have studied the initiative, including the Foundation for American Innovation, which has described the declaration as deliberately light on details. The State Department describes it as its flagship effort on AI and supply chain security, advancing a new economic security consensus among allies and trusted partners.
Since its launch, the initiative has been building out practical tools. In March 2026, the State Department announced it was seeking to deploy a 250 million dollar fund to invest in critical mineral processing and advanced manufacturing infrastructure in member countries. In April, it was announced that the Department was in negotiations to install a Forward Deployed Industrial Base on a 4,000-acre rent-free lease in the Philippines. In June, the second Pax Silica summit produced a Joint Statement on AI Opportunity, endorsed by dozens of countries, and the Department announced Pax Pass, an AI-powered supply chain platform intended to facilitate the shipping of goods essential to the AI economy, backed by 50 million dollars in funding.
The San Francisco Declaration is the latest step in that sequence: a move from broad principles to a specific, shared list of what the coalition will defend. Whether it leads to concrete action will depend on what the list contains and what the working groups do with it.
Why China, and Why Now
The accord does not name China in its reported title, but its target is not a secret. The Financial Times reported that the agreement is aimed at protecting AI supply chains from China, and every outlet carrying the story has described it in those terms. Helberg himself has been open about the framing: in public addresses and interviews, he has identified competition with China as one of Pax Silica's overarching goals.
The logic is straightforward. China dominates several layers of the AI supply chain, most visibly in the processing of critical minerals, including rare earths, which are essential for magnets, batteries, and electronics. The United States and its allies have been trying for years to diversify away from that dependence, with limited success. The accord is part of a broader US push to reduce dependence on China for critical materials, particularly rare earth minerals, and to diversify supplies for itself and its allies, as Newsmax reported.
The timing adds a second layer. Washington has accused Beijing of failing to meet commitments under a trade truce the leaders reached in late 2025. The Trump-Xi meeting in Shenzhen is, in part, an attempt to manage that tension. Signing the accord just before the meeting gives the United States a stronger hand: it arrives at the table having just demonstrated that a coalition of allies is willing to coordinate on supply chain security.
There is also a domestic political context. The agreement comes as a scandal involving former Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang fuels bipartisan demands for tighter US controls on AI chip exports, according to the TradingView report of the Financial Times story. Nvidia is the company whose chips power most of the world's advanced AI training, and questions about who gets access to those chips have become one of the most contested issues in US technology policy. For background on the wider contest, see our guide to US and China AI competition in 2026, which sets out the chip, model, and cost dimensions of the rivalry, and our explainer on Anthropic's 63 billion dollar chip deal, which shows how much money is now flowing into AI computing infrastructure.
What the Accord Does Not Do
It is important to be clear about the limits of what was signed. A declaration is not a treaty. It creates no legally binding obligations, sets no tariffs, imposes no export controls, and establishes no enforcement mechanism. The original Pax Silica declaration has been described by analysts as a statement of intent that changes no tariffs, taxes, or permits. The San Francisco Declaration appears to be cut from the same cloth: a commitment to cooperate, to identify, and to coordinate, rather than a set of rules.
That does not make it meaningless. Declarations of this kind matter because they create a framework within which concrete measures can later be agreed, and because they signal intent to third parties. China will read the signing as a signal. So will companies deciding where to build chip plants, mines, and data centres. But there is a real difference between a signal and a policy, and the reporting so far does not show that the accord crosses that line.
The other limit is transparency. The declaration's text has not been published, and the only public account of its contents is the Financial Times' reporting of Helberg's briefing. Until the text appears, it is not possible to verify the exact wording of the commitments, the scope of the joint list, or the structure of the working groups. Any analysis that claims to know more than the reporting supports is overreaching.
What to Watch Next
Several things will show whether the accord amounts to more than a signature. The first is the publication of the declaration's text, which will reveal the exact commitments and whether the language on China is explicit or implied. The second is the expected signing by Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission next week, which would widen the coalition and add the Netherlands' chip-equipment weight. The third is the joint list itself: what technologies it names, how specific it is, and whether it is published or kept internal.
The fourth is the Trump-Xi meeting in Shenzhen. If the meeting produces a trade understanding, the accord may be presented as leverage that worked. If the meeting goes badly, the accord may be presented as a fallback. Either way, the accord's real test will come after the summit, when the working groups either produce concrete measures or do not.
For businesses, the practical question is whether the joint list will affect what they can buy, sell, or build. A list that names specific technologies could lead to export controls, investment screening, or procurement rules that change supply chains. A list that stays vague will change little. Companies with exposure to Chinese suppliers, particularly in critical minerals and semiconductors, should be watching for the list's publication and for any follow-on measures from the working groups.
For everyone else, the accord is a reminder of how central AI has become to geopolitics. A decade ago, supply chain diplomacy was about oil and steel. Today it is about the minerals, chips, and energy that make artificial intelligence possible. The San Francisco Declaration is the latest attempt to organise that new reality into a coalition, and its success or failure will shape how AI is built, and by whom, for years to come.
The most practical way to judge the accord is to watch what happens in the next few weeks rather than what was said on the day it was signed. If the declaration's text appears promptly, and if the four expected signatories join on schedule, the coalition will look serious and organised. If the text stays unpublished and the joint list never materialises, the accord will look like a photograph opportunity taken before a difficult summit. Either outcome is possible, and the evidence will arrive soon enough.
What We Could Not Verify
- The full text of the San Francisco Declaration has not been published by the US State Department as of the time of writing. All details of its contents rest on the Financial Times' reporting of Jacob Helberg's briefing, as carried by other outlets.
- Whether the declaration names China explicitly, or only by implication, cannot be confirmed until the text is published.
- The exact scope of the joint list, and whether it will be published or kept internal, has not been confirmed.
- No specific export controls, tariffs, investment restrictions, or enforcement measures have been announced as part of the accord.
- The date of the Trump-Xi meeting is reported as Thursday 19 November on the sidelines of the APEC forum in Shenzhen, but the precise timing and agenda have not been officially confirmed in the reporting reviewed.
- The expected signing by Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission is reported as expected next week, not as confirmed.
- Figures cited for Pax Silica's funds, including the 250 million dollar critical minerals fund and the 50 million dollar Pax Pass platform, come from analyst summaries of State Department announcements, not from the declaration itself.
Sources
- Financial Times, "US and allies sign accord to protect AI supply chains from China", 15 November 2026, as reported by Newsmax: https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/AI-chip-accord/2026/11/15/id/1276369
- TradingView, "U.S., allies agree to coordinate AI supply chain security", 15 November 2026: https://www.tradingview.com/news/seekingalpha:06473e887094b:0-u-s-allies-agree-to-coordinate-ai-supply-chain-security/
- Korea Herald, "Nine nations sign San Francisco Declaration to jointly defend AI supply chains against China", 16 November 2026: https://biz.heraldcorp.com/article/10938093
- SiliconNoon, "Pax Silica allies agree a joint list of AI tech to shield from China", 15 November 2026: https://siliconnoon.com/pax-silica-allies-agree-a-joint-list-of-ai-tech-to-shield-from-china/
- Britannica, "What Is Pax Silica?": https://www.britannica.com/topic/What-Is-Pax-Silica
- US and China AI Competition in 2026: Chips, Models and What It Costs You
- Anthropic's $63 Billion Chip Deal, Explained Without the Hype
- DeepSeek AI: What It Is, How It Works, Models, Features, Pricing, and Uses in 2026